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This work is focused on the technology innovative system of the Silicon Valley, the difficulties of the 
transfer of this system to other territories, and what it might be transferred to Italian industrial districts in 
order to improve their technology development. This study is based on American literature about the Silicon 
Valley system and two study tours made in the Silicon Valley in 2016 and 2019 visiting universities, 
startups, medium and big companies of this territory. The study includes a first part dedicated to the Silicon 
Valley concerning its technological evolution, objective and strategies of its firms, its technology 
innovation process, the relation university-industry, the venture capital and the competitive advantages of 
the cluster of firms. In a second part we present a brief history of the technological development of Italian 
industrial districts and their technological innovation system, the limits of transfer of the Silicon Valley 
technological system and what it might be transferred to Italian industrial districts for their technological 
development. The study shows that Italian industrial districts have a common cultural and entrepreneurial 
vision in firms of the same territory similar to that of the Silicon Valley, although not necessarily of the 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
This article on the technology innovative system of the Silicon Valley is part of a line of 
research concerning the processes of technology innovation and the territorial innovation systems, 
and its originality consists in the fact that it studies the processes existing from the generation of 
innovative ideas until their transformation into new technologies, and not the effects that new 
technologies have on the socio-economic system as done by the majority of studies concerning 
technology innovation. In fact, if it exists a vast literature on technology innovation in relation 
with scientific research and its effects on economic growth, the complex process with which 
scientific results are exploited and transformed into new technologies are little studied and 
documented (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). In this context this research line does not enter in 
discussions for example about criteria used in the selection of projects and amount of financing 
of the R&D activity, but concentrates its attention on the nature of the technological processes 
occurring in various types of organizational structures for innovation such as the industrial R&D 
or the startup-venture capital (SVC) systems. In spite of these limits of the field of study, it is 
possible to enlighten the processes that are at the origin of formation of innovations supplying 
useful criteria either for technology innovation strategies or for certain aspects of the economy of 
innovation. In the study of the technology innovation system of a territory we do not study the 
specific technologies used in a territory, but their characteristics in term of degree of radicality 
and ramification following a general model of technology (Bonomi, 2020). Then in the frame of 
this line of research, the attention is not focused on the amount of personnel and facilities for 
innovation, but on the adhesion to the best practices and the obtained efficiency considering the 
human factor crucial in innovation, and R&D investments only a rough indication of the 
innovative level of a territory (Haour, 2019). An example of this type of study may be found in a 
previous article concerning comparison of the innovation systems of a Swiss and an Italian 
territory (Bonomi, 2018c). About the studies made in the frame of this line of research, there are 
a certain number of published IRCrES working papers, and this matter has been put together and 
used for the writing of a book about technology dynamics (Bonomi, 2020).  
The Silicon Valley represents an exceptional example of technology and industrial 
development that has an enormous technological and economic global effect, generating 
companies with the highest capitalizations in respect to traditional very big companies existing 
since many years. The study of the innovative system of the Silicon Valley is object of a vast 
literature, in particular of journalistic type, however about the nature of the technological 
processes of this territory there is practically only a limited American literature published in the 
nineties concerning the competition with electronic industry of the Boston area (Saxenian, 1996) 
and attempts to transfer the Silicon Valley system to the East Coast, in fact observing the great 
difficulty of transfer even using the contribution of Federick Terman, the godfather of the Silicon 
Valley, considered the person that has made most of the efforts to create the Silicon Valley 
innovation system (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 1996). Nevertheless, the study of the innovative 
system of the Silicon Valley is of most interest and has given a contribution to a better 
understanding of processes and structures of the dynamics of technology (Bonomi, 2020). 
Although the Silicon Valley innovation system is not transferable or adaptable to other territories, 
it is rich of processes and structures that may be taken in consideration for the improvement of 
the innovative system of other territories. For these reasons it is also interesting to consider 
 
A. Bonomi  
 
4 
whether the knowledge of the Silicon Valley system is useful for the improvement of innovation 
in Italian industrial districts that present great technological differences, but have similar common 
cultural and entrepreneurial vision in firms of the same territory although not necessarily of the 
same nature. In fact, it is interesting to observe that the inexistence of similar culture and 
entrepreneurial vision in the firms of the US east coast has been considered the major cause of 
failure of the tentative of transfer of the Silicon Valley system (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 1996). 
In this work we have reported mainly the description of the Silicon Valley system and only a brief 
reporting of the technological history of the Italian industrial districts. More detailed descriptions 
of Italian industrial districts are available in previous articles concerning cooperation in 
technology innovation (Bonomi, 2013) and (Rolfo & Bonomi, 2014), enabling technologies of 
Industry 4.0 for SMEs (Bonomi 2018a) and channels available for this innovation (Bonomi, 
2018b), and also about young entrepreneurship in relation with the new technologies (Bonomi, 
2018d). 
This study is based on documents, mainly American, that have described the competitive 
advantages of the Silicon Valley, and the attempts to transfer this innovative system in other 
territories. Furthermore, it is based also on two study tours carried out in the Silicon Valley, 
respectively in April 2016 and August 2019, for the study of the technological system of this 
territory www.siliconvalleystudytour.com . These study tours have been organized by the 
association “La Storia nel Futuro” www.storianelfuturo.org . The first tour in 2016 was made with 
a group of about twenty Italian entrepreneurs and managers guided by the organization “Italiani 
di Frontiera”  www.italianidifrontiera.com . The second tour in 2019 was made with a group of 
about fifty Italian university and secondary school students guided by the association. The activity 
of the association “La Storia nel Futuro” in the organization of the Silicon Valley study tours and 
its effects in generating startups has been described in a previous study on promotion of 
entrepreneurship in the new technologies (Bonomi, 2018d). Both tours were organized with the 
help of the Silicon Valley Italian Executive Council (SVIEC), association of Italian entrepreneurs, 
managers and researchers working in the Silicon Valley. This association, with more of 1500 
members, offers contacts with its members and discussions that may be hold in Italian and then 
with an easy understanding of the discussed arguments. Normally each tour includes meetings 
with researchers of the Stanford and Berkeley universities, incubators, startups, medium sized 
enterprises and very big enterprises such as Google. The weekly programs of the two tours had 
in the Silicon Valley is reported in the annex of this article. 
After this introductory section the study presents in a second section a description of the 
technological innovative system of the Silicon Valley, including the history of its technological 
evolution, the peculiar aspects of this territory such as the typical objectives, strategies and 
management of firms, the existing structure of technology innovation, the relations between 
university and industry, the venture capital, and finally the competitive advantages of the cluster 
of firms of the Silicon Valley. In the third section we outline some aspects of the technological 
innovation system of Italian industrial districts with analogies and differences with the Silicon 
Valley system, including a brief technological history of the Italian industrial districts and its 
technological innovation processes. In the fourth section we discuss the limits of possible transfer 
of the innovative system of the Silicon Valley, and in the fifth section the possibilities of transfer 
of some aspects of the Silicon Valley to the Italian industrial districts. Finally, in the sixth section 
we present the conclusion of the study. 
2. THE SILICON VALLEY TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 
The technological innovation system of the Silicon Valley cannot be explained without 
presenting its historical evolution. Other important points that shall be considered are the 
objectives and strategies of firms of this territory. These strategies are much different compared 
with those of common industrial firms. Other aspects of the system concern the typical innovation 
processes, the relation university-industry, the venture capital and the competitive advantages of 
the Silicon Valley cluster of firms. 
 
CNR-IRCrES Working Paper, 6/2020  
 
5 
2.1. History of the technological evolution of the Silicon Valley 
The name “Silicon Valley” has appeared for the first time in a series of articles about industry 
of the Santa Clara County published weekly by Electronic News in 1971, name after diffused 
worldwide in the 90’. The Silicon Valley is the result of a long innovative development process 
and its exceptionality has been recognized in USA already at the beginning of 60’, and later 
diffused worldwide with the appearance of PC. Actually, its development is the result of a long 
gestation that dates back to the 30’ of the past century and that may be divided in four phases. 
The first phase, from the 30’ to the second half of the 70’, corresponds to a great development of 
electronic technologies with the realization of integrated circuits and microprocessors that are at 
the base of the hardware of all successive products. The second phase has concerned the 
development of PC and relative software and lasted until the end of 80’. The third phase, since 
1991, has concerned the appearing of the World Wide Web and the diffusion of internet with the 
development of a system of informatic and communication technologies (ICT) including the 
realization of important new technologies concerning browsers, big data and cloud computing, 
social networks, e-economy and e-finance, operating often as a new system of continuous 
relations called platform (Cicero, 2017). Presently, at the beginning of the XXI century, we are 
in a fourth phase dominated by development of artificial intelligence (AI) applications. In Fig. 1 
we have presented the various phases sequence that is at the base of development of the Silicon 
Valley. Concluding it shall be noted that a certain number of companies of great importance were 
not founded actually in the Silicon Valley. That is the case for example of Microsoft and Amazon 
located near Seattle but for their interactions with the Silicon Valley may be considered be part 
of the history of this territory (Isaacson, 2011). 
The birth of the Silicon Valley is currently attributed to the efforts of Frederick Terman, 
professor and after dean of the Stanford University, not well known outside the Silicon Valley, 
but there considered the godfather of the development of this territory (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 
1996). He studied electric engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
returning to California and becoming in the 30’ professor of electric engineering at the university 
of Stanford. His idea was to create a research activity in electronics similar to that already existing 
in the east coast of the United States choosing to develop the field of micro-waves. Paying a lot 
of attention to the possible industrial applications of research, he visited a lot of small enterprises 
of the region arriving to an important conclusion that: if entrepreneurs with only an elementary 
education may reach anyway so clamorous results, what we might obtain giving them a university 
education? This consideration has been at the base of the relation university-industry in the 
Silicon Valley and essential for its success (Kargon, Leslie & Schoenberger, 1992). The first 
contribution of Federick Terman to the formation of the Silicon Valley was in the foundation in 
1939 of Hewlett & Packard (now HP) for production of electric instruments and equipment. The 
founders, Bill Hewlett and David Packard, the first was a Terman’s fellow of studies, the second 
one of his students at Stanford. During the war Terman was called for his experience to manage 
at MIT a laboratory for the development of countermeasures for radars coming back in 1946 to 
the university of Stanford. In the same year this university created the Stanford Research Institute 
(now SRI international) for the development of research contracts with industry charging Battelle 
for its organization (Boehm & Groner ,1972). Terman then encouraged the university to create in 
1951 the Stanford Industrial Park (now Stanford Research Park) and in 1954 the Stanford 
Electronics Laboratories, sure that basic research would be a source of exploitable ideas for the 
development of new devices or systems considering arbitrary the division between fundamental 
and applied research programs (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 1996). Another important fact for the 
development of the Silicon Valley was the transfer in 1953, from the Bell Laboratories in New 
Jersey to Palo Alto, of William Shockley, discoverer of the semiconductor properties of silicon 
and its use as transistor, founding a company for the production of silicon semiconductors (Stuart, 
Leslie & Kargon, 1994).  This firm opened the road to successive developments bringing to the 
production of integrated circuits with the foundation in 1957 of the Fairchild Semiconductors by 
two associates of Shockley: Robert Noyce and Gordon More, this last well known for his 
predictive law on miniaturization of integrated circuits. The Fairchild Semiconductors generated 
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from 1959 to 1971 35 startups in electronics (Morris, 2014) including the Integrated Electronics 
now known with the name of INTEL This company succeed in the development of the first 
microprocessor, the INTEL 4004, with the contribution of Federico Faggin, an Italian physicist 
working at INTEL (Faggin, 2019). The INTEL 4004 has been the prototype of a series of 
improved microprocessor that are the core system of PC. During the Cold and Korea Wars there 
was an intensive activity of development and production of electronic devices and computers for 
the Pentagon raising a competition between the Silicon Valley and the so called Route 128, a 
region situated along an important road of communication around Boston with headquarters of 
important electronic industries such as Digital Equipment (DEC), Data General (DG), Wang, etc. 
(Saxenian, 1996). Towards the end of 60’ the Silicon Valley surpassed the concurrence of Route 
128 with its flexibility and capacity of innovation due to its structure composed by firms 
connected by an efficient supply system and exchange of information and competences in respect 
to the rigidity of structures and slowness of decisions of the integrated system of production of 
the great companies of Route 128 (Saxenian, 1996). The final blow occurred in the 80’ when the 
great companies of Route 128 persisted in the production of minicomputers while the Silicon 
Valley pointed its efforts to the PC that showed to be less expensive and performant like 
minicomputers. It shall be noted that the American electronic industry development after the war 
may be considered essentially the result of military commissions, neglecting consumable 
electronic products developed on the contrary by Japanese industry also buying American patents 
not of military interest. Another aspect that shall be noted is that development financed by military 
commissions enabled the Silicon Valley to make R&D projects for innovations with a certain 
radicality that industrial capitals would not probably have supported for their technological risk 
and uncertainty on their market potential. At the beginning of 70’ the end of the Korea War, 
detente of the Cold War, accompanied by the oil price shock on 1972, caused a diversion of funds 
towards energetic problems reducing the military commissions compelling the Silicon Valley 
industry to consider civil applications of their technology. A typical example was the case of 
ROLM, a company producing minicomputers, that diversified its production applying computer 
technologies to telephonic equipment for medium sized firms winning the competition with 
products of major companies such as AT&T (Lane & Maxfield, 1995). In fact, this evolution, 
oriented the production of Silicon Valley towards PC and necessary software beginning in this 
way a second phase of development. 
If the first phase of development of electronic technologies is associated to the name of 
Fredrick Terman, the second phase of development concerning PC may be associated to the name 
of Steve Jobs, founder with Steve Wozniak of Apple in 1976. Steve Jobs may be considered the 
person that understood the first the true potentiality of PC developing a product, not necessarily 
addressed to experts or hobbyists, but to a large public making it easy to use (Isaacson, 2011). In 
particular Steve Jobs introduced with the model Macintosh in 1984 a graphic interface by screen 
bitmapping, in fact developed at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Centre (PARC) but improved by 
Apple. Such graphic interface was further used by Microsoft for the realization of the Windows 
system, in particular for PC of IBM, but after diffused in many other types of PC. That reduced 
the market of Apple that however remained producer of the best PC from the technological and 
aesthetic point of view although more expensive. The great expansion of the PC market at the end 
of 70’ induced many firms of the Silicon Valley to integrate productions making internally all the 
components of PC, choice already made by the great electronic firms of Route 128 for the 
minicomputers with a strategy based on numbers more than on margins of profit of products 
(Saxenian 1996). However. the entry in the market of Japanese producers, especially in the market 
of standard products and memories, raised a lot of difficulties to the integrated firms of the Silicon 
Valley due to, not only for the lower cost, but above all for the Japanese firms organization able 
to produce with a high quality and minor defects (Saxenian, 1996). In order to face this situation 
integrated Silicon Valley firms returned to an activity based only on innovation and components 
production based more on profit margins than on quantity (Saxenian, 1996). At the end of 80’ the 
production of components, such as memories and integrated circuits, was nearly completely 
disappeared in the Silicon Valley substituted by a supply obtained by firms of the South East Asia 
(Madrigal, 2013). 
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The introduction of the World Wide Web in 1991 allowing the diffusion of communication 
among PC opened a third phase of development of the Silicon Valley with new products assuring 
communication and computing services such as routers, tablets, notebooks and transformation of 
current phone apparatus in portable smartphones becoming, not only a mobile phone but also a 
mobile computer. The new communication technologies joined with computer and informatic 
technologies formed what it is called the information and communication technologies or ICT, 
and new services in term of browsers as Google and Yahoo, social networks as Facebook and 
Linkedin, e-commerce companies as Amazon, diffused globally allowing to the Silicon Valley to 
reach a leader position supplying hardware and software for these services. Browsers had a further 
development for example with the supply of knowledge such as Wikipedia and Google map while 
internet gave the possibility to develop new more efficient services such as Uber for urban 
transportation and Airbnb for hotel services. This phase of development favored also a worldwide 
diffusion of new technologies based on ICT with socio-economic and not technological objectives 
using capabilities such as: big data storage, cloud computing and tools such as computers or 
smartphones as well as infrastructures as Wi-Fi and internet creating in this way a great number 
of specific services that have reached a great importance from the social and economic point of 
view. 
Presently the activity of the Silicon Valley may be considered entered at the beginning of the 
XXI century in a fourth phase dominated by the applications of artificial intelligence (AI). 
Hardware and software of this technology did not found origin in the Silicon Valley but in some 
American universities since the 50’, and found a development only in 80’ with a tentative to 
develop software for the realization for example of expert systems for problem solving or data 
mining, based essentially on the logic if … then. However, in order to make the system operative, 
it was necessary to supply previously all data and rules to cover all the possibilities of a system 
in order to obtain the searched solution, that however were hard to obtain limiting in fact the 
viability of the system. An important improvement in AI technology occurred by introducing 
systems operating with artificial neuronal systems imitating the biological system existing in 
human brain (Warwick, 2012). That made possible, not only to introduce data and rules but also 
exploiting the possibility of the system to learn by direct experience in what it is called deep 
learning. AI in fact interests all types of technologies and Silicon Valley industry takes in 
consideration this technology for the improvement of actual products and development of new 
products. Important examples are the development of artificial car driving, digital manufacturing, 
financial technologies (fintech), etc. It is possible that AI applications would be in future at the 
base of social and economic transformations similar or more advanced in respect of those 
observed with the development of PC and ICT. 
2.2. Objectives, strategies and management of Silicon Valley firms 
Before discussing objectives, strategies and management of firms of the Silicon Valley it is 
useful to consider some fundamental aspects that are at the origin and development of the Silicon 
Valley phenomenon, characterized by a different vision in respect to the typical industrial and 
financial ways of thinking, and that appeared clearly in the discussion hold during the study tours 
made in this territory. A good analysis of the existing differences may be found in a German 
journal article (Schultz, 2015). In this article the journalist discusses differences, origins and 
future of the Silicon Valley views. In particular he underlines the facts that, differently of common 
focus of industrial and financial activity, in the Silicon Valley the primary focus is not on money, 
not on how much we consume but what we consume and how we live, and that not stumbling 
haphazardly into the future but rather with a clear agenda. The Silicon Valley phenomenon cannot 
be considered simply based on internet or social networks, nor based on intelligence and data 
supply and messaging services, or jobs replaced by software and the launching of entire new 
industries. In fact, what we are witnessing is a societal transformation in which the digital 
revolution is not just altering specific sectors of the economy, but changing the way we think and 
live. The Silicon Valley phenomenon had in fact its root in the counterculture of the 60’ that found 
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in San Francisco bay area one of its major centers, and a future thought shaped by a new 
technology that, differently of past technologies does not increase only human physical capacities 
but also human intellectual capacities.  
The principal objective of the activity of Silicon Valley firms is innovation and many aspects 
as turnover, profits, markets important in conventional firms are considered the secondary 
consequences of the innovative activity. The idea is that the pursuit of a continuous and intense 
activity of innovation will fatally have exceptional results in term of turnover, profits, etc. 
(Saxenian, 1996). The fact that innovation is a central point in the firm’s activity, the organization 
of work is based principally on projects activity and management by objectives, and not by 
working time. The consequence is a large freedom for the personnel in the choice of time and 
ways to carry out the various tasks using largely remote working, in the respect of the exigences 
of the planned project, and knowing that judgment will be on the base of the reaching the 
objectives and not on the quantity of work made. The number of employees of firms tends to be 
variable as a function of success or failure of the innovative projects and firm needs. Personnel 
may be dismissed or hired, as a function of the competences, several times independently a person 
has worked in the meantime for a concurrent firm favouring in fact knowledge exchange, and in 
the frame of a local market not based on availability of work force but of competences. It should 
be noted that such type of exchanged knowledge, typically generated in the R&D system in either 
successful or abandoned projects, is a great source of innovative ideas and does not necessarily 
arise patents conflicts as it represents often a knowledge originated by projects, but not necessarily 
linked to the objectives of the projects in which it is formed (Bonomi, 2020). All that is at the 
base of a dynamism of the industrial system founded not on a specific technology or product but 
on the competence of every constituting part and their multiple interconnections (Saxenian, 1996). 
After the negative experience in the 80’ in integrating all the production phases cited previously, 
the activities were stabilized by buying externally the most part of components, establishing 
cooperative relations with suppliers, a horizontal organization with few differences in status, open 
communication with personnel at all levels, large distribution of stock options. The firms of the 
Silicon Valley in their development tend to avoid a direct competition on conventional products 
but rather tend to make them obsolete through radical innovations. For example, in the case of 
minicomputer the Silicon Valley did not entered in direct competition with minicomputers of 
Route 128, although it had all the technologies for their fabrication. It simply developed an 
innovative product such as PC making obsolete the minicomputers that disappeared from the 
market. The central position of innovation in the firm strategies brings to a structure of matrix 
type. This structure is characterized by a simple vertical hierarchical structure with maximum two 
or three levels controlling the various groups of competences of the firm and the presence of 
autonomous lateral figures heading the essential firm activities in form of projects using the 
necessary competences chosen in the vertical structure. Such type of structure was born in the 30’ 
at the Battelle Columbus Laboratories to carry out efficiently an activity of contract research with 
industry, and probably arrived in the Silicon Valley in 1946 with the organization by Battelle of 
the Stanford Research Institute cited previously (Boehm & Groner, 1972). Such structure is 
diffused in the Silicon Valley not only in firms but also in universities having strong relations 
with industry. 
2.3. The technology innovation processes in the Silicon Valley 
The technology innovation process may be described composed by five steps, the first 
consisting in the generation of the innovative idea, the second in the feasibility study, the third in 
economic and performance studies, the fourth in industrialization and the last concerning the 
generation of further technologies through the use of the technology (Bonomi, 2020). These steps 
are represented schematically in Fig. 2. Actually, these steps in the Silicon Valley may be 
condensed into three main phases: generation of innovative ideas, development of technologies 
and use of technologies.  
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Generation of innovative ideas 
In the Silicon Valley it may be observed a climate particularly favorable to the generation of 
innovative ideas, that because of the large circulation of knowledge generated by R&D activities, 
exploitation of scientific research and exchange of competences. New ideas may appear 
individually, as it was the case of invention of PC by Steve Wozniak (Isaacson, 2011), or emerge 
from generative relation among various individuals as it has been described in the case of ROLM, 
a company of the Silicon Valley (Lane & Maxfield, 1995). Technological innovations of the 
Silicon Valley occur through new combinations of preexisting technologies possibly exploiting 
new phenomena discovered by science. Simple combinatory process is the case for example of 
the invention of PC by Steve Wozniak cited previously, while combinatory process exploiting 
new scientific knowledge was the development of solid-state transistors based on discovery of 
specific properties of silicon by William Shockley (Bonomi, 2020). 
 
Development of technologies 
Following technology dynamics studies, the development of technologies may occur mainly 
through organizational structures such as the R&D projects system or the Startup-Venture Capital 
(SVC) system (Bonomi, 2020). Silicon Valley is known to have boosted in particular the 
realization of technological innovations through the SVC system. Startups are small companies 
developing new technologies with the objective to reach an exit consisting in the selling the 
developed technology or collecting capitals to become an industrial company. Startups carry out 
also R&D projects activities but accompanied by a business model development suitable for the 
developed technology. Venture capital (VC) finances startups but with a different strategy in 
respect to industrial capital financing R&D projects (Bonomi, 2019) and that it will be discussed 
in a further section about VC in the Silicon Valley. 
 
Use of technologies 
Following technology dynamics studies the use of technologies may also generate new 
technologies mainly of incremental nature induced by externalities influencing the use of the 
technology (Bonomi, 2020). In fact, in the Silicon Valley this aspect concerning the use of new 
technologies has evolved toward a new organizational structure for innovation called platform. 
This new system is based on new types of relations, and not on different types of financing as in 
the R&D and SVC systems, and involves a new system of supply and demand of technologies 
(Cicero, 2017). In a platform there is a continuous relation between the peer consumers using a 
technology or a service and the platform. A platform is managed by the owners with their partners 
and have discontinuous relations for the supply of technologies or services with peer producers 
as a function of the needs of the platform. The key point of the platform is not only in supply or 
demand of services or technologies but in the exchange of knowledge between the users of a 
service or technology and the platform that make possible continuous improvements of 
technologies and services as well generation of innovative ideas (Bonomi, 2020). Many Silicon 
Valley important companies operate following a platform system such as Facebook or Linkedin 
for social network, Google in the field of knowledge and Amazon in the field of e-commerce. A 
typical example of platform system is in the supply of operative systems for computer and 
smartphone carried out for example by Apple, Google and Microsoft. The users of this systems 
are linked to the supplying platform that receive information about the use, furthermore peer 
producers supply to the platform new applications that may be used only with the specific 
operative system. Recently the platforms have evolved toward a system of industrial platform for 
the supply of ICT in particular to the manufacturing industry (Bonomi, 2018b). 
2.4. The relation university – industry in the Silicon Valley 
We have already noted the historical importance of the Stanford University in the development 
of the Silicon Valley and this territory is rich of institutions that reach a total number of about 
fifty   universities, colleges and business schools. The institutions are dominated by the presence 
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of the universities of Stanford and Berkeley, this last is included in the public University of 
California system. These two universities are characterized by their great dimension and the close 
relations with the industry of the Silicon Valley. These universities receive not only financing by 
the industry but also important donations for their activity. The relation with industry is managed 
through a matrix structure cited previously, and there are internal budgets for the development of 
innovative ideas that are possibly generated by exploitation of scientific research but also 
generated by R&D projects activities with new ideas not necessarily linked to the objective of the 
projects. In fact, the existence of a generation of collateral knowledge in R&D activities is 
essential to assure the continuity and development of research projects activities (Bonomi, 2020). 
Consequently, the strong point of the universities of the Silicon Valley, recognized especially for 
Stanford, is that they do not wait for contacts with local industry for collaborations, but identify 
important opportunities emerging from research, and pursuit an aggressive attitude by proposing 
them to industry (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 1994). The openness of American universities towards 
industrial application of scientific research is the results of their entrepreneurial vision not limited 
by only cultural objectives as often occurs in Europe. This difference exists since many years, and 
it is characterized by an integration of didactic, research and applications activities in the 
American universities (Ben-David, 1968). That does not mean that fundamental research is 
neglected, on the contrary in universities such as Stanford or Berkeley it is considered of high 
interest as it is a source of radical innovative ideas with a great social and economic potential, and 
an example of this view has been the creation of the Stanford Electronics Laboratories in 1953 
already cited. The lower interest for applications of scientific research in Europe has been 
confirmed also recently by studies in Italy (Bonomi, 2014a) and in a certain measure also in 
United Kingdom (Lam, 2011). Discussion with Italian researchers of Stanford University with 
previous experience in Italian universities, it is noted that scientific research in Italy is more 
focused, giving on the other side publications of high level as noted in the recent report on Italian 
research and innovation (CNR, 2018), while researchers of Stanford have more freedom exploring 
new fields often without the expected results but sometimes giving radical discoveries that may 
be exploited with a great advantage in technological applications. The universities of the Silicon 
Valley, and in particular Stanford, have accentuated further the entrepreneurial vision even in 
respect to the other American universities such as the MIT, that had a rival role with Stanford in 
the competition of Route 128 with the Silicon Valley. In particular MIT ignored the success of 
Stanford in building programs and promoting interactions between the university and local 
technological firms, refusing to offer alternatives to their standard programs of study and 
establishing preferential relations with the big corporations instead of the emerging local firms 
(Saxenian, 1996). A last observation concerns the role of contract research laboratories vs. 
innovation activities of firms of the Silicon Valley. Contract research is an activity started in USA 
since the beginning of the XX century with Arthur D. Little and the Mellon Institute and creation 
of Columbus Laboratories by the Battelle Memorial Institute in 1929. Battelle in particular had a 
great development creating after the war also subsidiaries in Europe (Boehm & Groner, 1972). 
Actually, contract research laboratories did not have a great stimulating effect on American 
industrial research especially in the case of the Silicon Valley (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 1994). In 
fact, the Stanford Research Institute made some contributions to technologies of Silicon Valley 
especially in computer human interface elements such as the mouse, but actually found its 
development in other fields and it was separated from the Stanford University in 1970 changing 
the name in SRI International. On the other side the expansion of Battelle depended more on its 
activity in organization and management of contract research laboratories than on industrial 
research contracts. In fact, after organization of the Stanford Research Institute in 1946, it 
obtained the Pacific North-West Laboratories near the Hanford National Laboratories for civil 
applications of nuclear energy in 1965, carried out the organization of KIST in South Korea in 
1966, and it was charged in 2000 of management of a certain number of National Laboratories 
including Oak Ridge and Brookhaven. 
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2.5. The venture capital of the Silicon Valley 
The Silicon Valley is characterized by a very important presence of VC that plays an important 
role in the development of startups assuring the technology innovations of this territory. 
Historically the first financing organization with the characteristics of modern VC was the 
American Research and Development (ARD), formed in 1946 by MIT and business leaders of 
the Boston area (Lerner, 2000), but this organizational structure for innovations has found its great 
development at the end of 70’ in the Silicon Valley with VC attracted by potential of innovative 
ideas generated in this territory. Financing of technology developments of VC is radically 
different from that of industrial financing innovations through R&D projects. The objective of 
industrial financing is the obtaining of a return of investment (ROI) by exploiting the new 
developed technology. VC objective is completely different and consists in obtaining an exit by 
selling the developed technology or the entire business of a startup and reinvesting the obtained 
capitals from this ROI in new technology developments through startups in form of a cyclic 
activity (Bonomi, 2019). In other word the VC activates a financial cycle, as reported in Fig. 3, 
in which startup projects are proposed to VC that selects those suitable for financing, Startups 
enter in activity, part of them are abandoned and a minor part reaches an exit generating a return 
of investments to VC. This ROI is partly retained by VC and the rest reinvested in new startups. 
For the economic sustainability of the cycle it is necessary that ROI be high enough to cover 
investments made either for successful or abandoned startups. If obtained ROI is higher than the 
value of equilibrium, there is an increasing availability of investments capacity of VC that in 
presence of a large availability of startups projects generates an autocatalytic growth of the 
system. In the Silicon Valley the VC tends to be differentiated by one side following the 
innovation field of startups, technological, socio-economic, etc. on the other side following the 
phase of development. In this case there is a trading activity among VC companies that are 
involved in the various phases of financing the startup development, adapting in a certain way the 
increase of capitalization with the decrease of risk and increase of potential ROI. In this way it is 
formed a market of startups with list of capitalization values that in the Silicon Valley are reported 
in local data banks that, of course, are associated to a high volatility. It shall be noted that in the 
Silicon Valley many big companies, initially created as startups, tend to continue to operate 
internally like a startup and also to use their own large availability of capitals to finance startups 
instead of acquisitions entering in competition with VC. On the other side it may be observed that 
founders of startups that receive part of ROI obtained in an exit sometimes use this capital to 
finance also new startups. An historical case of this type was Steve Jobs excluded from Apple 
that invested with the obtained capital in his own startup NeXT and in the company Pixar 
(Isaacson, 2011). The strategy of VC of the Silicon Valley in the selection of startup projects to 
be financed is based principally on the potential of their ROI and validity of the startup teams. 
This strategy is different of typical European strategies in selection based mainly on the estimation 
of the feasibility of the startup project. The consequence is that the rate of abandoning of startups 
in the Silicon Valley is very high reaching values around 90% while in Europe the values are in 
the range of 70-80%. In fact, in the Silicon Valley, the estimation of the feasibility of a startup 
project is considered too aleatory and the economic success of the SVC financial cycles is pursued 
by financing a high number of projects with high ROI potential in such a manner to have some 
very successful exits in order to compensate the financial loss of the many abandoned startups. 
This strategy has been found economically more successful than that based on estimation of 
feasibility of the project, and that it is due also to VC knowhow, developed in the Silicon Valley, 
in the selection, support and monitoring of the startup activities. In the Silicon Valley the VC 
practically shapes through capitalization the industrial structure of the territory. From the point of 
view of the type of existing industry we may distinguish on the base of the financial dimension a 
dozen of very great companies such as Google, Apple, etc. with hundreds billion US$ of 
capitalization, followed by a greater number of companies with intermediate capitalizations of 
the order of hundreds million US$ called unicorns. These companies look for big increments of 
capitalization, often in conflict with the very big companies, and sometimes with consequent 
bankruptcy or acquisition. There are finally the startups, probably in the order of several 
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thousands, with limited capitalizations and with a nature more similar to a project with the 
objective to reach a favourable exit, but much of them destined to abandonment and only few 
ones to an exit with the selling of the technology or acquisition of capitals for their transformation 
in an industrial company. 
2.6. The cluster of firms of the Silicon Valley and its competitive advantages 
We have already seen in the previous sections that the presence of a cluster of firms with 
peculiar and strong relations with internal and external interactions is at the base of the success 
of the Silicon Valley, and characterized by the presence of an integrated market of competences 
and startups. Another innovative aspect of this territory is the practical absence of promoting 
organizations differently of many European territorial innovation systems. Actually the Silicon 
Valley may be nevertheless considered the result of an activity of promotion, similar to the present 
European activity, but that occurred just after the 2nd world war with the creation for example of 
research laboratories such as the Stanford Research Institute and the Stanford Electronics 
Laboratories and the realization of the Stanford Industrial Park, all that accompanied by military 
financed R&D activities that have generated the present basic technologies of the territory. All 
that finally lead to the formation of an autonomous innovative system, developed through various 
phases, in which governmental R&D financing was substituted mainly by VC, contract research 
and donations to the universities. In every case there are some necessary conditions for the 
functioning of the system such as the presence of important universities, a climate encouraging 
the creation of new enterprises, and the presence of what it may be defined an externality of 
agglomeration that expresses the benefic existence of a cluster of firms with similar culture and 
entrepreneurial vision in the same territory (Kargon, Leslie & Schoenberger, 1992). Another point 
of force of the Silicon Valley is in avoiding the pursuit of a single technological trajectory, as it 
occurs in many other enterprises and regions, but a rich range of technological and organizing 
alternatives. The competition in the Silicon Valley is based on a continuous innovation, avoiding 
to reach conditions of industrial maturity, implicit in the evolution and localization of industries 
with mass production based on minimization of production costs (Saxenian, 1996). Actually, the 
firms of the Silicon Valley put at the core of their capacities the technological advances, the design 
and assembling of final products, careless of possible cannibalization of their previous products. 
In this manner the companies continue to operate like a startup, sharing costs and risks with their 
partners and suppliers. In the Silicon Valley the big companies, differently to conventional ones, 
do not tend to expand their hierarchical structure and to integrate productions, but conserve a 
matrix structure based on projects and forming subsidiaries to which they assure a large 
management independence, otherwise are a source of spinoff generating independent startups 
considered often a potential source of collaboration more than of competition. Another aspect 
existing in the Silicon Valley is the easy and useful exchange and discussion of new ideas without 
fear to by copied or giving importance to patents rights. The experience of the Silicon Valley 
shows that the valid ideas, that are really of interest for patents, are those formed by working in 
the startups and not the initial ideas that might be deeply transformed to become valid. Finally, it 
shall be considered that the success of the Silicon Valley of specialized firms has depended 
critically on a surprising common acceptance of the same technical standards. Furthermore, the 
growth of an increasingly rich and complex network of suppliers has reduced unexpectedly the 
advantages of big integrated firms that make internally their components favoring firms of small 
dimension (Saxenian, 1996). Additionally, it shall be noted that presently in the cluster there are 
not only local firms in the field of ICT but also research centers of external companies and 
organizations such as the ALMES research center of NASA, the IBM research center at Almaden 
and the Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) of Xerox. Furthermore, there are many offices and 
laboratories of American and foreign companies that consider important their presence in this 
territory for their activities interacting with local firms and functioning as antenna for information. 
It should be finally noted the importance of the role of suppliers represented by an important 
number of small and medium sized firms active in designing, production of prototypes, small 
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productions and various services supporting firms with the typical activities existing in the Silicon 
Valley from startups to big firms. These types of firms, that have some similarities to the network 
of subcontractors existing in Italian industrial district, although they are involved mainly, not in 
mass production of components, but in prototypes or in small productions, being main 
productions subcontracted normally to China and south east Asia. Their existence has been in fact 
marginally cited during the discussion with companies of the Silicon Valley, and they have been 
also cited in the autobiographic book of Federico Faggin, the inventor of microprocessor, in the 
case of suppliers producing silicon wafers and memories used during the development of Zilog, 
his first startup (Faggin, 2019). It is probable that this network has been formed during the 80’ 
when the Silicon Valley companies decided to abandon the integrated production, subcontracting 
this activity in south east Asia. However, for the development of new products, it is useful to have 
local suppliers with which discuss innovative processes sharing with them costs and risks as cited 
previously. This type of firms has not been payed of attention in studies like the other types of 
firms of the Silicon Valley, however, for their type of activity and links with the companies of the 
territory, it would be of interest to study this particular sector of firms looking for similarities or 
differences with the typical Italian industrial districts, and how these firms follow the continuous 
technological development occurring in the Silicon Valley. Unfortunately, within the study tours 
carried out it was not possible to have contacts with this type of firms and a new study tour 
specifically dedicated to interviews with this type of firms would be necessary to get information 
about such subcontracting sector of the Silicon Valley. 
3. THE TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION SYSTEM OF ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS 
The comparison of the technological innovation system of the Silicon Valley with that of 
Italian industrial districts had an important role in studying some fundamental aspects of the 
innovation process in particular its combinatory nature (Bonomi, 2020). In fact, in respect to 
conventional industrial innovation strategies, both systems are characterized by different 
approaches to generate and finance innovations (Bonomi, 2020) having at the same time many 
differences but also some similarities that merit to be discussed. Historically Italian industrial 
district had two periods of development, the first in the second half of the XIX century and the 
second, more important, in the few decades just after the 2nd world war of the XX century. If there 
is a huge amount of studies of social and economic studies on Italian industrial districts, the 
technological aspects of this industrial system have been little studied especially in the period of 
the second half of the XIX century. Before discussing the differences and similarities of the 
technological innovation system of the Silicon Valley with that of the Italian industrial districts it 
is useful to give a brief history of the evolution of the districts, in particular from a technological 
point of view, and a description of their technological innovation system.  
3.1. Technological history of Italian industrial districts 
The technological origin of Italian industrial districts may be ascribed to various causes such 
as technology transfers from more advanced neighboring countries in particular from Switzerland 
and France and, for example, the formation of the cotton spinning district of Verbano, a territory 
in the north east of Piedmont region, was due to transfer of entrepreneurs, workers and cotton 
spinning machines from Switzerland at the beginning of the XIX century generating a relatively 
important district in the second half of the century (Bonomi, 2012). Other technological sources 
forming industrial districts were transformation of ancient form of handicraft productions into 
industrial productions, for example, the handcrafted production of bells gave origin of the 
important districts producing faucets and valves by exploiting knowhow on bronze casting of 
bells used also to produce faucets, and substituted later by brass casting. Another important source 
of technologies was the return of migrants from abroad with acquired knowhow in new 
technologies. That was for example the case of Alfonso Bialetti, emigrated in France at the 
beginning of the XX century and returned to Italy in 1918 with experience in aluminum casting. 
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His invention of the successful Moka Express® coffee-maker in the 30’ would not be possible 
without the knowledge of aluminum casting technology necessary to make the special design of 
Moka Express® coffee-maker (Bonomi, 2020). Its production had an important role in the 
afterwar development of the household district of Cusio, another territory in the north east of 
Piedmont region (Bonomi, 2014b). The Italian industrial districts of the XIX century were in 
particular involved in textile industry that, from the technological point of view, were not 
developed like other more advanced industries of the European countries, and penalized by cost 
of imported coal for production of energy that, for these reasons, was produced mainly by 
hydraulic power with its limitations. Only in the last years of the XIX century it was substituted 
partly by hydroelectric production of energy. The technological situation in the nineteenth century 
of Italian industrial districts may be described considering, as example, the case of the district of 
cotton spinning of Verbano (Bonomi, 2003). The industry of this territory was originated by a 
technology transfer, occurred in 1808, realized by brothers Gian Giacomo and Sigismondo Müller 
from Switzerland including 38 workers and machines for mechanical cotton spinning, and 
characterized by using hydraulic power as source of energy. This territory, with about 15,000 
residents near the end of XIX century, formed an industrial district composed by about 40 
factories, mainly in cotton spinning activities but also with about ten factories for the production 
of felt hats, reaching a total number of more than 5,000 workers. The technology efficiency in 
cotton spinning, measured in term of number of spindles controlled by a worker, was ranging 
from 50 to 70, much lower than the values over hundred in the more advanced European countries 
that used the “self-acting” technology. However, it shall be noted that Verbano industry known 
an interesting technological advance by Carlo Sutermeister introducing in 1891 the use of 
electrical energy by realizing probably the first Italian suburban electrical line of 5 km from a 
hydroelectric plant of about 500 kW of power to his factory (Bonomi, 2012a). At the beginning 
of the XX century the sources of energy used in industries of Verbano were for the 36% 
hydroelectric, 20% hydraulic, 33% steam from coal and 11% from coal gas. Although the 
contribution of Italian industrial districts of the XIX century to technology innovations was clearly 
inferior in respect to the districts developed in the afterwar period, the social relations among 
enterprises, the importance of competences and exchange of personnel, the existence of similar 
culture and entrepreneurial vision in the territory has been conserved and boosted in the new 
districts development of the afterwar period and constitutes a major similarity with the Silicon 
Valley social system. Another important aspect of nineteenth century districts was the importance 
given by the entrepreneurs to technical instruction of workers as source of benefits for the industry 
and welfare for the population. That was the case for example of Lorenzo Cobianchi, an 
industrialist in cotton spinning of the district of Verbano. Died in 1881 he provided in his will a 
sum for the creation of a technical school entered in activity in 1886, and addressed to young 
teenagers following a three years course (Bonomi, 2012b). This school has become now an 
important technical secondary school in Italy with more than 1500 students. Although the 
enormous difference of school dimension, it shall be noted how the idea of social importance of 
education of Lorenzo Cobianchi was not dissimilar of ideas of Leland Stanford realizing his 
university in the same historical period. In the after-war period since the 50’ until 70’ it was 
observed in Italy a great development of industrial districts reaching a number of about 150, and 
including not only textile industry but also many other types of activities the main in mechanics 
but also in plastic and rubber, jewelry, leather and shoes, ceramic tiles, etc. The mechanical sector 
was involved mainly in productions such as faucets and valves, tool machines, boilers and heaters, 
metallic households, electrical appliances and many others. The success of Italian industrial 
districts was due mainly to export of products not only because of lower prices but also for a good 
technical level and design. After the 70’ there was an arrest of the great development of industrial 
districts and some of them entered in a decline. There are many reasons of this arrest, one of the 
main was surely the competition with emergent countries, in particular China, that had an easy 
task to copy the conventional productions of Italian districts, but also the interruption of 
generation of important technology innovations has played an important role in this arrest. 
Generation of radical innovations, such as the Moka® Express coffee-maker or the introduction 
by Candy of horizontal drum in washing machines, nevermore appeared in the years after the 70’. 
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We may here describe briefly two examples of technology evolution of districts, the first 
concerning the production of faucets and valves that conserved a good international competitivity, 
and the other concerning production of households that on the contrary entered in a decline. The 
production of faucets and valves is present in two districts and includes several hundred firms 
located in the province of Brescia and in the northern part of the province of Novara that in fact 
have a close cooperation. Firms of these districts have given always a lot of attention to the 
products and production technologies introducing automation and, in the more advanced firms, 
robotization of assembling the products since the 90’. They payed also a certain effort in R&D by 
making studies and forming in 2006 a consortium for cooperation in R&D with participation of 
about twenty important firms (Rolfo & Bonomi, 2014). All that allowed to conserve a position, 
despite the strong competition of China, of second world producers of faucets and valves after 
China and before Germany. The production of households is also present in two districts in the 
province of Brescia and in the territory of Cusio cited previously. These districts have known a 
development of technological origin concerning skill in working stainless steel for household 
products and some innovative products such as the Moka® Express coffee-maker and pioneering 
the production of small electrical appliances such as mixers and coffee-grinders, however the 
leading firm GIRMI in these productions did not resist to competition of bigger foreign firms and 
disappeared. In fact, in these districts, differently of the case of faucets and valves production 
there was neither the birth of cooperation in technology innovation nor the appearance of new 
products and production technologies as in the first phase of their development. These facts, 
joined to competition with Chinese productions, contributed to condemning them to a decline 
(Bonomi, 2014b). These histories show how the technological factors had an important role in the 
development and after in the decline of Italian industrial districts. 
3.2. Technological innovation system of Italian industrial districts 
The technology innovative system of Italian industrial districts is based essentially on 
innovations resulting by combination of existing technologies rather than exploiting results of 
scientific research and is concentrated mainly on the conception of the product and in its 
assembling. That is the main difference from the innovation system of the Silicon Valley in which 
scientific research is very important for technology innovation, although are known some 
important purely combinatory innovations such as the case of PC invention by Steve Wozniak 
(Bonomi, 2020). This difference is surely due to a difference in the relation between university 
and industry existing in Italy in respect to the Silicon Valley. In Italian universities it did not 
appear any figure like Frederick Terman that understood the potential of university education also 
for entrepreneurs of the small enterprises of the industrial districts. Italian scientific research 
remains mainly linked to cultural purposes. Initiatives to propose actively R&D projects for 
technological innovation to industry such as the case of the Stanford University in the Silicon 
Valley (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 1996) practically never appeared also because of lack of means 
for this purpose in universities. On the other side firms of industrial districts have a limited interest 
to contact universities for their technological needs, in fact, for small enterprises, it is difficult to 
have available capitals for R&D as the cost of this activity is independent of the size of the firm 
and prefer to make innovations by combining existing technologies. Nevertheless, the Italian 
industrial districts were in most cases be able to assure in this way innovation and productivity in 
their activity (Hall, Lotti & Mairesse, 2009). An important aspect of the industrial structure of 
Italian districts is the large use of subcontracting firms for certain phases of their production. 
These subcontractors have many different customers and form a complex network of firms for 
the production in industrial districts. Such situation, as cited previously, exists also in the Silicon 
Valley in which many firms subcontract externally the entire production in south east Asiatic 
countries or in China. The network of firms with partly subcontracted production operations has 
a certain number of advantages in respect to integrated production. In fact, an innovation 
introduced by a subcontractor favours not only the subcontractor but also its customers diffusing 
the advantage in the district firms. Actually, a major advantage of the network structure of Italian 
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districts is in its flexibility existing in the period of economic recession. In this case a producer 
firm may arrest subcontracting avoiding losses that would have if this phase of production was 
integrated in the firm. On the other side the subcontractor may not have major losses by arrest of 
subcontracting of a producer having many other customers that not necessarily are all affected by 
recession then allowing a certain continuation of the activity. There is also a possible inconvenient 
in this type of network when an innovation is introduced by a producer but that necessitates 
changes in the technology of the subcontractor in what it is called an intranality effect (Bonomi, 
2020). That has been observed for example in the study of the innovation processes of an Italian 
industrial district of production of ceramic tiles in which a new product or process developed by 
a firm, necessitating complementary innovations in subcontracting firms, would be adoptable 
only if it generated an important demand for the firms that should introduce the complementary 
innovations (Russo, 2003). An important difference between the Silicon Valley and the Italian 
industrial districts may be found in the objectives of the firms. While in the Silicon Valley the 
firms look for new products with a large potential for a worldwide commercialization, the 
industrial districts produce mainly conventional products, sometimes very specialized, in market 
niches that fortunately have in many cases a strong export potential. Concerning technology 
innovation in addition to limits in available capitals for R&D discussed previously, there is also 
limits to formation of startups financed by venture capital because of the small potential of niche 
markets in term of ROI and then of limited interest to VC looking normally for innovations with 
high ROI potential in order to sustain the SVC cycle (Bonomi, 2020). A possible solution to 
financing R&D projects is the organization of cooperation of a certain number of SMEs about 
R&D activities with common financing and exploitation of results. That is the case for example 
of Consortium Ruvaris that organizes R&D activity for about twenty firms producing faucets and 
valves (Rolfo & Bonomi, 2014). A present challenge existing for Italian industrial districts 
concerns the introduction of ICT for the improvement of their production with robotization and 
digital manufacturing as well as of their products with introduction of internet of things. Also, in 
this case the problem is about availability of capitals for this transformation and a possible 
solution might be the realization of common fully robotized and digitalized production plants with 
enough flexibility to cover fabrication of all type of products of the participating firms that would 
limit their activity to the design and the commercialization of the products. Another possible 
evolution might be the introduction of an industrial platform system in the industrial districts 
network to improve exchange of knowledge and boosts generation of new technologies (Bonomi, 
2020). 
4. LIMITS TO TRANSFER OF THE INNOVATIVE SYSTEM OF THE SILICON VALLEY 
The Silicon Valley, because of its long history of development, the complex technological 
evolution based initially on electronic components and computers, followed by development of 
PC and ICT, and now of new technologies with socio-economic objectives and artificial 
intelligence applications, makes the transfer of this system to another territory quite complex. 
Furthermore, the Silicon Valley has a financing system for technological innovations based 
mainly on VC, and not on industrial capitals and it is not promoted by public aids as in many 
other territories. All that accompanied by an entrepreneurial climate and uncommon industrial 
strategies makes this system difficult to copy and adapt to other territories. Actually, the 
ingredients that have made exceptional the case of the Silicon Valley are well known, but what it 
is unknown is how to be in measure to apply these ingredients in other territories with tangible 
results (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 1996). In fact, since of the 60’ business groups elsewhere set up 
to build their own version of the Silicon Valley, some also enlisting the assistance of Federick 
Terman with his experience in this territory, but without the expected success (Stuart, Leslie & 
Kargon, 1996). Actually, a cited positive case of the emerging of a similar cluster between 80’ 
and 90’ concerned biotechnologies and ICT in the Capitol Region near Washington DC. Its origin 
may be attributed to the birth of entrepreneurship favored by externalization of many 
governmental services but with a dynamic quite different of that of the Silicon Valley (Feldman 
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& Francis, 2002). Many attempts to realize on the East Coast industrial clusters in electronic 
industries, even assisted by Terman, were unsuccessful. That was the case of interventions in New 
Jersey with the Institute of Science and Technology and with the help of the Bell laboratories, as 
well at Dallas in Texas with the Graduate Research Center (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 1996). 
Studies made on these attempts to apply the model of the Silicon Valley by Terman in other parts 
of the United States indicate as origin of the failure an overestimation of importance of a particular 
educational policy, developed at the Stanford University, as catalyst of the regional development, 
while it has been underestimated the difficulty to persuade the firms in competition to cooperate 
for common objectives as it occurs in the Silicon Valley (Stuart, Leslie & Kargon, 1996). It shall 
be noted that this type of difficulty is the same observed in trying to develop a cooperative 
approach to R&D in Italian industrial districts beside the successful case of the faucets and valves 
districts (Rolfo & Bonomi, 2014). Beside the cited unsuccessful attempts of Terman, on the 
contrary his intervention in South Korea with the creation of the Korean Advanced Institute of 
Science (KAIS) had a certain success. This intervention, promoted in 1965 by the Korean 
president Park with a loan 150 million US$ obtained by the United States and beneficiating of the 
assistance of Terman, but also of Battelle that organized the Korean Institute of Science and 
Technology (KIST) with the objective to develop research programs for industry after merged 
with KAIS forming the Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). The 
Terman’s idea was that KAIS would act as a bridge between the Korean industry and more 
advanced technologies of other countries ignoring paradoxically the small and medium 
enterprises and startups that the same Terman had promoted in the Silicon Valley. That because 
he considered them unwanted competitors of the big enterprises. However, examination in detail 
of the followed policies it appears that success of South Korea cannot be attributed only to 
technological innovation efforts and then to R&D investments, based on model existing in USA, 
but also by adopting Japanese industrial organization. That may suggest that the South Korean 
experience may hold important lessons for both the developed and developing countries (Stuart, 
Leslie & Kargon, 1996). 
Coming back to the question of transfer of experience of the Silicon Valley it is useful to 
consider also aspects linked to the nature of the involved technologies and the velocity with which 
such technologies may be innovated. This aspect is important when the experience of the Silicon 
Valley is considered for other territories, not only different in culture and entrepreneurial vision, 
but also involved in sectors different of ICT. One of the factors that made winning the Silicon 
Valley has been certainly the strong innovative potential of ICT. This favorable situation is not 
necessarily present in other developing technological sectors such as biotechnologies, 
nanotechnologies or green technologies. The velocity of innovation of these sectors, beside limits 
due generation of innovative ideas and availability of investments, has physical limits depending 
on the velocity with which it is possible to change the technological operations composing a new 
technology during the activity of development (Bonomi, 2020). In fact changes of components in 
an electronic circuits or lines of an informatic code are more rapid than change of components of 
a pilot plant of a new chemical process or a mechanical part of a prototype, while for example the 
development of biotechnologies for medical applications are subjected to necessary protocols of 
long testing before having commercialization permits. Another advantage of the development of 
the Silicon Valley is the fact that ICT finds application in nearly all other technologies by 
increasing their efficiency, and that might even become more important with the development of 
AI. Furthermore, it shall be considered that in the Silicon Valley do not exist practically limits to 
availability of investments for technology innovations and then innovation depends more by 
generation of innovative ideas than by availability of capitals. Concluding, the great innovative 
potential, the nearly unlimited availability of capitals for innovations, the relatively high velocity 
in realizing new technologies in ICT, have been important factors for the rapid development of 
the Silicon Valley since the 70’, but these conditions are not necessarily easy to obtain in a 
territory with different social relations and culture, and involved in other technological sectors. 
However, the study of technology dynamics may be of some utility in getting some aspects of the 
Silicon Valley for improvement of technology innovation in other territories. That may be done 
through the identification of the technological processes and organizational structures for 
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innovation that have characterized the development of the Silicon Valley and, although the entire 
system cannot be transferred or adapted to another territory, it is possible to consider some 
elements of this system that can be transferred and recombined in order to obtain nevertheless 
improvements in the innovation system of the territory. 
5. LESSONS OF THE SILICON VALLEY SYSTEM FOR THE ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS 
Considering now the case of Italian industrial districts we may note that the problem of transfer 
of the Silicon Valley system is in a certain manner different of that observed in the attempts of 
transfer to the US east coast. In fact, in the Italian industrial districts there are, in a certain measure, 
similar types of relations and cooperation among firms of the Silicon Valley that did not exist in 
the east coast territories and being the origin of failure of the transfer. On the other side the great 
difference in respect to the Silicon Valley are the relations of firms with universities and research 
institutes that are nearly absent, and technological innovations based on combination of pre-
existent technologies and innovative design rather than exploitation of new results of scientific 
research. On the other side the origin of Italian industrial districts, historically based on 
industrialization of handcrafted activities, transfer of technologies from abroad with personnel 
and machinery and return of migrants with knowhow in new technologies, is quite different of 
the origin of the Silicon Valley essentially promoted by the universities, in particular by Stanford. 
At this point the supply of realistic suggestions for the transfer of certain aspects of the Silicon 
Valley in order to improve the Italian industrial districts is not an easy task. Nevertheless, 
following what we have described, it appears that an important point concerns the relations 
university – industry that should be changed by both sides in order to increase technological 
innovation exploiting results of scientific research, and not only by combination of pre-existent 
technologies. That could help Italian industrial districts in finding new niches linked to new 
technological fields in order to assure their future stability and development. That does not mean 
that innovations based on pure combinatory process should be neglected, on the contrary the 
knowledge of modern technologies should be promoted also considering that technologies, not 
necessarily of the same technological sector, have been found important by experience in the 
generation of new technologies in other sectors. That could be made for example promoting 
competence centers open to contacts with industrial districts firms. The difficulties existing in 
dealing this critical point are either present both in the universities and industrial districts sides. 
In Italian universities scientific research is seen more as a cultural fact and practically structures 
and regulations favorizing a strong entrepreneurial view as in USA are absent. Universities with 
their research laboratories tend to have a passive attitude toward industry waiting contacts rather 
than propose possible specific projects emerging from scientific research with an aggressive 
attitude acknowledged in the Silicon Valley by the case of for Stanford university (Stuart, Leslie 
& Kargon, 1994). Positive practice of this type are also present in contract research organizations 
such as Battelle in order to establish a fruitful R&D relation with industry (Bohem & Groner, 
1972). Furthermore, the research activity in Italian universities is impeded by heavy bureaucratic 
and administrative regulations that slow down the activities. Finally, an important factor 
influencing negatively the relation university-industry in Italy is the attribution of industrial 
property of inventions to researchers and not to the university. The rationale is that, in general, 
universities are better equipped to extract the best value from the patent than are individuals 
(Haour & Miéville, 2011). There are some juridical aspects about attribution of industrial property 
to researchers that in fact are payed employees of the university. Normally in research 
organizations patents are property of the organizations as inventions are considered one of the 
tasks of the researchers. Italian rule about industrial property of invention means apparently that 
Italian universities do not consider inventions as one of the tasks of their payed researchers as in 
universities of many other countries. That, instead of favoring inventions, has negative 
consequences because cost of protection and negotiation of development of an invention are high 
and cannot be easily covered by researchers owning the property of the patent, while that may be 
easily done with university funds, and finally all that discourages researchers to look for 
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applications of their research results. On the other side in the firms of industrial districts there is 
a diffused opinion considering of poor utility the possible support of Italian universities for their 
technological needs, ignoring the possibilities of scientific research in generating innovative 
ideas, especially of radical nature and then very competitive. In this way the technological 
competitivity of industrial districts, beside few radical innovations occurred in the past, remains 
linked to innovations of incremental type of combinatory nature in a Red Queen regime (Bonomi, 
2020) exposed to disruption due to appearing of radical technologies external to the district as 
occurred in the Swiss watch district in the 70’ with the mechanical watches against quartz based 
watches developed by Japanese industry (Bonomi, 2020). A change of attitude of industrial 
district firms toward opportunities of collaboration with universities is important in facing the 
actual complex evolution of technologies that necessitates also technological diversifications in 
order to remain competitive. Another aspect of importance that may be learned in the Silicon 
Valley concerns management and strategies of enterprises. A survey carried out on about thirty 
Italian managers and entrepreneurs of firms, with either activities in services or manufacturing, 
that have carried out a study tour in the Silicon Valley (Bonomi, 2014c) has shown that the major 
interest is in the methods of management and in the activity of development of business models, 
rather than in the technological activity of this territory as it appears in the results reported in Fig. 
4. This small survey is indicative of how much is important the improvement of management 
beside technology innovation. A difficulty of Italian industrial districts to adopt the SVC system 
for development of innovations, typical of the Silicon Valley, is the limited ROI that may be 
expected by niche markets frequently considered by district firms, and the poor interest of VC in 
financing this type of startups with low expected ROI (Bonomi, 2020). Actually, the strong point 
of Italian industrial districts in adopting successfully elements of the Silicon Valley would be the 
promotion of their network of relations based on a common entrepreneurial vision that however 
shall be adapted to the new conditions of markets and innovation systems. That means to consider 
not only cooperation with universities and research laboratories, but also a more intense 
cooperation in R&D projects of common interest resolving the problem of financing R&D 
existing for single firms, cooperation that has been already realized in certain cases (Rolfo & 
Bonomi, 2014). Another important existing challenge for the industrial districts is the introduction 
of ICT in productions consisting in full robotization and digital manufacturing that require high 
level of investments but necessary to maintain the competitivity. A possible solution might be, as 
already cited, the investment in the creation of a common production plant of great dimension, 
fully robotized and digitalized, and enough flexible to produce the different designed products. In 
this case the main activity of producing firms would be limited to the design and 
commercialization of products and subcontracting of production (Bonomi, 2018b), a typical 
activity diffused in the Silicon Valley. A positive note on possibilities of Italian industrial districts 
to exploit the Silicon Valley system was discussed in a conference during the annual meeting of 
the Silicon Valley Italian Executive Council, the 23rd April 2016, and hold by Riccardo Di Blasio, 
managing director of Cohesity, a firm of the Silicon Valley, that had personally the occasion of 
working also in the Italian district of furniture in the Brianza territory. In his conference he has 
emphasized the similarities of Italian industrial districts with the Silicon Valley, existing in the 
type of network relation and common entrepreneurial vision, being a real possibility in the 
exploitation of Silicon Valley experience for their development. Finally, it should be considered 
that a promotion of Silicon Valley lessons in Italian industrial districts means a change of 
mentality either in university researchers about finding of applications in their activity or in 
district entrepreneurs about the validity to consider scientific research for new technologies. This 
change of attitude is easier to be obtained in young people to which should be focused any 
promotion in this direction, as shown by experience of the Association “La Storia nel Futuro” 
with study tours for students (Bonomi, 2018d). 
 




In conclusion we have seen how the technology innovation system of the Silicon Valley 
represents a special case in which firms and financing of innovations have objectives, strategies 
and management quite different of conventional industrial systems and characterized by particular 
advantages in the relation university – industry. These aspects joined with specific characteristics 
of the cluster in term of network relations and common entrepreneurial vision have produced 
competitive advantages and a great development. We have also seen that the Silicon Valley 
system is hardly transferable to other territories in which the industrial system and culture are 
different. Comparing the Silicon Valley with Italian industrial districts it appears clearly that the 
main difference may be found in the weak relations existing between firms and universities and 
research laboratories, while technological innovations of districts are of combinatory nature 
without exploitation of scientific results limiting the possibility to have radical competitive 
innovations. On the other side the existence of a firm network, diffusion of subcontracting 
relations and a common entrepreneurial vision have some similitudes with those of the Silicon 
Valley. Considering some suggestions for the improvement of efficiency of Italian industrial 
districts based on lessons of the Silicon Valley system we have surely the improvement of the 
relations university – industry with a change of attitude by both sides with more initiatives by 
universities and more opening of firms toward exploitation of scientific results. On the other side 
the existing social similitudes should be exploited by improving cooperation in R&D and possibly 
production facing the actual complex evolution of technologies that necessitates also 
technological diversifications in order to remain competitive. 
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26° Italiani di Frontiera Silicon Valley Tour 
23rd - 30th April – Program 
 
 
Saturday 23rd Check in Comfort Inn, 1818 El Camino Real - Redwood City, CA 94063 
 
Sunday 24th 
10 am Presentation and San Francisco tour with Roberto Bonzio 
 
Monday 25th Private Bus at Inn at 8 am / back 4.30 pm 
10 am Lawrence Berkeley Labs - UC Berkeley www.lbl.gov 
One Cyclotron Road – Building 70A – room 3377 - Berkeley, CA 94720 
6 pm SVIEC Meeting and Dinner - speaker Riccardo Di Blasio, Coo Cohesity 
www.cohesity.com 
c/o Donato Enoteca, 1041 Middlefield Road - Redwood City, CA 94063  
 
Tuesday 26th Private Bus at Inn at 8 am / back after dinner 
9.30 am Meeting at Stanford Church 
10 am Stanford University www.stanford.edu  
School of Engineering - Stanford, CA 94305 
4.30 pm BootUp World www.bootupworld.com 
68 Willow Road, Menlo Park, CA 94025 
 
Wednesday 27th Private Bus at Inn at 8.30 am / back 5.30 pm 
10 am IBM Research – Almaden www.ibm.com 
650 Harry Road - San Jose, CA 95120 
2.30 pm A3CUBE www.a3cube-inc.com 
2, North First Street - San Jose, CA 95113 
 
Thursday 28th Private Bus at Inn at 8.30 am / back 7 pm 
10 am Netapp www.netapp.com 
495 East Java Drive Sunnyvale CA 94089 
3 pm Carr&Ferrell www.carrferrell.com - meeting with Vittorio Viarengo 
120 Constitution Drive – Menlo Park, CA 94025 
 
Friday 29th Private Bus by Hotel at 11 am / back 5.30 pm 
12.30 pm Google www.google.com 
1911 Landings Drive – Mountain View, CA 94043 
 
 



































































Applications of AI 



















Stanford Research Institute 





























Selection based mainly on 













































Fig. 4. Fields of interest of firm participants to study tours in the Silicon Valley. 
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This work is focused on the technology innovative system of the Silicon 
Valley, the difficulties of the transfer of this system to other territories, 
and what it might be transferred to Italian industrial districts in order to 
improve their technology development. This study is based on American 
literature about the Silicon Valley system and two study tours made in 
the Silicon Valley in 2016 and 2019 visiting universities, startups, 
medium and big companies of this territory. The study includes a first 
part dedicated to the Silicon Valley concerning its technological 
evolution, objective and strategies of its firms, its technology innovation 
process, the relation university-industry, the venture capital and the 
competitive advantages of the cluster of firms. In a second part we 
present a brief history of the technological development of Italian 
industrial districts and their technological innovation system, the limits 
of transfer of the Silicon Valley technological system and what it might be 
transferred to Italian industrial districts for their technological 
development. The study shows that Italian industrial districts have a 
common cultural and entrepreneurial vision in firms of the same 
territory similar to that of the Silicon Valley, although not necessarily of 
the same nature, and a weakness in the relation university-industry with 
difficulties existing in both sides. 
 
 
